Introduction
The recent global financial crisis as a result of its impact on government finances has put pressure on welfare institutions, which typically absorb a significant proportion of government spending. As a result, since 2008 governments around the world adopted a range of social policy reforms (Farnsworth and Irving 2011; Greve 2011; Starke et al. 2013 , Vis et al. 2011 ) whose consequences have not yet been fully assessed. In the pension field, the post 2008 period has witnessed the adoption of radical reforms, such as the renationalization of private pillars of individual accounts introduced in the 1990s. Renationalization has attracted prominent attention with scholars explaining the type and timing of enacted reforms as the product of institutional and economic factors (Arza 2012; Datz and Dancsi 2013; Fultz 2012; Simonovits 2011) . Nonetheless, radical pension reforms may also include instances of radical retrenchment of the public pension pillar, resulting in a significant reduction of pension benefits for both current and future pensioners.
Analyses that compare the factors underlying the adoption of such diverse range of radical pension reforms are still missing in the comparative pension reform literature. Taking into account the different types of radical reforms, is it possible to detect a common reform mechanism that explains this broad range of radical shifts in pension policy? More specifically, what are the factors that explain the adoption of radical pension reforms that may significantly reduce or increase the role of the state in pension provision? Ultimately, do these radical reforms prevent the adoption of further measures? The article aims to explore the above questions and fill in the gap in the comparative welfare state and pension reform literature by focusing on the latest radical reforms enacted in Argentina and Greece after 2008: nationalization of the private pillar in the former and radical retrenchment of the public pillar in the latter.
In understanding the factors that explain the latest radical reforms, we argue that -in the context of the recent global financial crisis-highly indebted countries with no access to international financial markets and unsustainable pension systems introduce radical reform as a response to pressing economic concerns, related to the need to access funding and ameliorate their fiscal position. In such context, the structure of the pension system shapes the reform content: renationalization or radical retrenchment. Nonetheless, the subordination of the reform to short-term economic goals undermines the sound-footing of the reformed pension system essentially limiting it to a 'quick fix' which acts to the detriment of adequacy and sustainability issues. Ultimately, in a context where pension reform is increasingly being used as a tool serving short-term macroeconomic goals, we expect to witness radical reforms which may nonetheless not prevent further reforms.
The increasing adoption of radical reforms in other countries like Bolivia and Hungary in 2010 and Poland in 2013 allows us to argue that the two countries under study should not be regarded as exceptional or extreme cases. On the basis of this observation, our analysis provides insights in understanding the mechanism of other recently adopted reforms thereby contributing to the literature on pension reform and to comparative welfare state research.
Pension reform amidst the global financial crisis
The literature on the politics of pension reform has grown significantly over the past twenty years. Early studies, focusing on continental pension systems characterized them as 'frozen landscapes', highlighting their reform inertia (EspingAndersen 1996; Myles and Pierson 2001) . As public pension systems enjoyed high levels of public support, radical reforms were considered risky both in political (electoral) and economic terms (Bonoli and Palier 2007) . In relation to the latter, the transition to a multi-pillar system i has been regarded out of reach due to the 'double payment' problem. This problem arises from the fact that in public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems where workers pay contributions that are used to finance current pensions, the transition to a funded system would require workers to continue to pay contributions to the public pillar in order to pay the pensions of current pensioners and, in addition, make contributions to the new private pillar of individual accounts to finance their own future retirement (Myles and Pierson 2001) .
Alternatively, this cost would have to be financed by the government either from general revenue or by issuing new debt.
In the EU, the Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact essentially prohibit the adoption of reforms with a negative impact on government deficit and debt limits that member states must observe. Thus, the introduction of a private mandatory pillar financed through an increase of public debt has not been considered as a viable option for many European countries (James and Brooks 2001) . However, more recent studies have showed that radical retrenchment has been possible in continental European pension systems through an incremental process entailing long phasing-in periods and the introduction of a funded second pillar in stages in exchange for the support of key veto actors in the policy process (Bonoli 2000; Bonoli and Palier 2007; Ebbinghaus 2011; Immergut et al. 2008; Natali and Rhodes 2007) .
Latin American countries have chosen a more radical path by introducing structural reform entailing a one-step partial or full privatization of their public pension system, with Chile leading the way in 1981 with the replacement of its public pension system with one of mandatory individual accounts. Since the Chilean reform, pension privatization has been promoted globally as a comprehensive answer to the fiscal problems of public pension systems with more than thirty countries around the world adopting a partial or full privatization of their public PAYG systems (Orenstein 2013) .
Examining the reform process in Latin American countries, Brooks (2009) highlights the influence of financial markets essentially through the creation of a 'double bind.' Globalized financial markets foster strong incentives for privatization so as to achieve the long-term macroeconomic goals of sound fiscal policy (by limiting the state's rising long-term unfunded pension liabilities as a result of population ageing) and potentially attract foreign investment. Yet, pension privatization simultaneously increases the risk of punishment in the short-term for cash-strapped governments. This is because governments in a dire financial position (with limited borrowing capacity and high debt levels) that decide to privatize their pension systems may risk capital flight as investors worry about their capacity to honor their current debt and the one that would emerge as a consequence of financing the transition to a private system (Brooks 2009, 30) . The main implication of Brooks' argument is that by attending to short-term concerns of global capital, reformers ultimate trade-off some or all of their long-term privatization objectives. A similar conclusion to that of Brooks has been advanced by Kay (1999) and Madrid (2003) , among others.
We support that some of the insights related to the distinction between short and long-term economic concerns gained by scholars of the first wave of structural pension reforms in Latin America can be applied to understand the radical reforms enacted in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. We argue that worried about their rapidly increasing debt costs in the context of declining availability of funding in international markets or directly barred from accessing them, governments have advanced radical pension reforms as a way to rapidly improve their finances.
The subordination of the reform process to short-term economic concerns has not allowed enough time for the consideration of adequacy and sustainability issues though, thus raising questions as to the sound-footing of enacted reforms and the justification of the reform on the transition to a fairer and more sustainable system. In essence, we contend that by subordinating pension reform to short-term economic concerns, further reforms should be anticipated to address the sustainability and adequacy issues that have not been properly tackled. In addition, current reforms might also open the way for the introduction of further reforms if new economic concerns arise.
While the pension reform literature has analysed the role of social partners in the reform process (Carrera et al. 2011; Madrid 2003; Natali and Rhodes 2007) during the recent crisis the role and influence of external constraints (international financial markets) has increased in parallel with a decline of that of social partners to shape reform (Natali and Stamati 2014) . In addition, the need to resort to 'quick fix' has limited the time available for consultation with social partners as was the case during the reforms enacted in the 1990s. Therefore, in contrast to the previous reform wave, while social partners have continued to be present their role has been marginal. In terms of their political systems, the presidential system of Argentina and the parliamentary system in Greece ensure strong governments. While the crisis has contributed to a rise of political instability in Greece, both the socialist government that passed the 2010 reform and the technocratic one that introduced further measures in 2012 have not challenged the policy package accompanying the rescue agreement.
In fact, it was the socialist government who requested the rescue agreement from the troika of the EC, the ECB and the IMF, while the technocratic government was formed with the specific task of introducing the additional austerity measures.
Similarly, in Argentina the Kirchner administration has enjoyed a majority or a near majority in each Chamber of Congress. This explains why the reform bill was barely changed by Congress. Therefore, both institutional and partisan veto players have not been able to affect reform outcome in more than a marginal way.
In the following sections we examine the ways in which each country's fiscal position along with the lack of access to financial markets and the sustainability of the pension system have driven reform. In particular we will examine how the reform proposed has been essentially judged for its ability to alleviate fiscal pressures and /or restoring investors' confidence which has essentially taken precedence over adequacy and sustainability issues of the pension system itself, despite being justified as a transition to a more sustainable system. In 1994, Argentina adopted a structural pension reform of its public PAYG, earnings-related pillar, adding a private pillar to which workers would make contributions in individual accounts managed by pension fund administrators (Madrid 2003) . The design adopted was a partial private system where all workers made contributions to a basic public pillar and then had a choice between the private pillar and an earnings related public pillar. Such complex design was a result of the "double payment" problem and the political negotiation with opponents from the labour movement during the 1994 reform (Madrid 2003; Brooks 2009 Similar to Argentina, the 1990s were also a landmark for pension reform in
Greece. Nonetheless, while reforms have been adopted almost every two years the structure of the pension system has essentially remained the same with reform being limited to housekeeping measures so as to minimize opposition from trade unions While in both cases the introduction of measures to tackle the systems' adequacy and sustainability challenges seemed unavoidable, the crisis speeded up the process in an unexpected way.
Reforms amidst the crisis
The landmark reform of 2008 in Argentina entailing the renationalization of its pension system is the end result of a process that (despite its unexpected outcome) shifting the balance of the system from private provision to the state. Firstly, it addressed the private pillar bias (essentially reversing it) by stipulating that workers who did not make an active choice would have their contributions allocated to the earnings-related public pillar, instead of the private pillar. In addition, the law allowed workers to switch back from the private pillar to the public pillar, an option that was not available under the previous legislation. The law also mandated that workers with pension pots worth less than 20,000 AR$ (around 6,370 US$) and within ten years of their retirement age would be automatically transferred to the public pillar. Finally, the law improved the replacement rate of the public pillar and mandated that the state would top up pensions paid by private pillar if these were below a specified minimum. The fall in the price of the bonds would increase their yields and thus the payments that the Government would have to make, putting further pressure on government finances.
As the government was unwilling to drastically reduce public spending, renationalization of the private pension pillar was viewed as an option for reducing public debt obligations and improving budget balances (Calvo et al. 2010) .
Renationalization resulted in an inflow of large sums of money to the Social Security Administration of around 9.5 percent of GDP, as the reform law stipulated that all assets from private pension fund administrators would be transferred to the fund managed by the social security administration (Anses 2013). This transfer was Finally, the government gained influence in key private sector companies as it became a shareholder in companies where private pension fund administrators had shares.
The government justified the radical reform by highlighting the weakness of the system (a discourse similar to the one used in the Greek reform) and the "bad administration practices" of pension funds, which led to the decline in the funds' In terms of the negotiation of the reform, the government presented the reform as a matter of utmost urgency given the sharp fall in the value of assets in the private pension pillar. The law only contained 22 articles and simply stipulated that all contributors and assets of the private pillar would be transferred to the public pillar.
The reform signified a return to the idea of the state as the main provider of retirement income that fitted with the overall orientation of the government macroeconomic policies of more state intervention in the economy. Furthermore, given the poor performance of the private pillar, the history of intermittent contributions to the private pillar and the high costs of the system, opposition to the bill was minimal (Arza 2012) . The social partners, in the voice of the main labor confederation (CGT) openly supported the move given their opposition to the 1994 reform. The reform bill was swiftly debated in three weeks passed in the Chamber of Deputies with 68 percent of the vote, and in the Senate with 72 percent (Arza 2012 ).
The short-term funding concerns that dominated the 2008 reform meant that there was not much analysis on the impact of the reform on public finances in the medium and long-term (Arza 2009 ). In fact, during the reform process the government did not provide any official estimates on future spending on the new public pension system, thus raising concern about its future sustainability. Under the new system, future pensioners will obtain a pension that will amount to 45 percent of their average earnings in the 10 years prior to retirement. Estimates provided by private analysts at the time of the reform showed that the new system could experience a deficit between 1.7 and 4.1 percent of GDP already by 2030, reaching over 5 percent by 2050 (Bridger and Cado 2008, 12) . In sum, the focus on the shortterm goal of gaining access to fresh funding may affect the financial sustainability of the system in the long term.
Similarly to Argentina the Greek reform is the (unexpected) outcome of a reform process that started in the early 1990s and culminates with the recent one.
Similarly again to Argentina pension reform has been affected by past economic choices with detrimental effects on the country's fiscal position. Pension reform re- Thus, in contrast to Argentina who used pension reform to access funds to bypass her isolation from financial markets Greece used reform as part of an effort to affirm her ability to undertake reforms that would allow her to re-access international markets. 
Conclusions
The present article focused on instances of radical pension reform in Argentina and Greece following the latest economic crisis. Whereas the contribution of pension reform in maintaining sound finances has been examined in the past, the crisis has challenged us to focus on the use of radical pension reform as a tool serving short-term economic goals and on the implications of such choice on the future prospects of pension systems. Fiscal pressures and lack of access to international financial markets coupled with the unsustainability of the pension systems under study are central in understanding the radical character of enacted reforms. In both countries, pension reform provided an immediate ease on budgetary pressures in a context of no access to international markets. The structure of the pension system has shaped reform content: rationalization of assets held by the private pillar in Argentina and radical retrenchment of the public pillar in Greece. Nonetheless, while the reform mechanism has been similar, the underlying reason was different: Argentina pursued the reform as a way to bypass her continuous isolation from international markets, while Greece introduced the reform as an attempt to show her readiness to them and aiming at an eventual return.
Reform has been facilitated in both cases through a legitimising discourse defending the transition from the current unfair and unsustainable pension system to a fairer and more sustainable one. However, the use of pension reform as a "quick fix"
to pressing economic concerns has not allowed the proper consideration of adequacy and sustainability issues raising concern as to the sound-footing of the new pension system architecture opening up a window for further interventions.
External constraints, namely the role of international markets, have gained importance during the recent crisis, while the role of social partners has diminished.
In addition, the subordination of the reform process to short-term economic goals has resulted in limited room for consultation with social partners, thus lowering their influence.
The increasing adoption of radical reforms in other countries around the world allows us to argue that the insights from our analysis are useful to understand other recent cases of radical pension reforms. Within the EU, the Hungarian reform constitutes a typical example. In 2010 the government pursued a radical pension reform by de facto re-nationalizing the second pillar introduced in 1998 under pressure to finance her short-term debt obligations and promote deficit reduction in a context of restricted access to international credit. Like in the case of Argentina, the government sought a 'quick fix' by using the accumulated capital of the second pillar's funds as a source of finance (Simonovits 2011) . In 2013 Poland nationalized her private pillar with the government justifying the reform as a way to reduce government deficit and debt levels (Reuters 2013) . Beyond the EU, Bolivia adopted renationalization to allow the government to access around 3$billions (Mesa Lago 2013). While critics have argued that the reform would increase long term costs, the government in a similar way to Argentina justified the reform by highlighting the loss in value of funds due to the crisis and the low coverage of the system (Hujo 2013, 263) As radical reforms are increasingly being adopted by countries a central question relates to the extent at which such reforms succeed in securing the long-term sustainability of pension systems. The analysis of pension reform in Argentina and Greece seem to confirm Datz and Dansci's (2013: 92) observation that 'when pensions become levers for state financing under duress not only are careful calculations about the long-term sustainability of the pension system [are] neglected.
It therefore comes as no surprise that despite the adoption of radical reform pensions are still an important issue on the political agenda.
A final issue of concern relates to the changing public-private mix. Thus far, while we have seen a retreat of the pension orthodoxy, this has not been compensated by an increase in state provision resulting in the overall retrenchment of pension benefits. Pension privatization might not be exactly dead (cf. Orenstein 2011) , yet the new model is still in the process of being shaped without though showing signs of a return to the past, i.e. a reaffirmation of the state's central role in pension provision. 
